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of rehabilitation. In re Haffey, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1850 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ky. 2015).
CONTRACTS
 AGISTER CONTRACT. The plaintiffs were cattle owners who 
contracted with the defendant for grazing cattle on the defendant’s 
ranch. The contracts provided 
“GRAZER’S DUTIES: Grazer shall provide adequate grass 
and water for Owner’s cattle as nature shall provide. Grazer 
shall provide feed and mineral to Owner’s cattle according to 
the seasonal, nutritional needs of Owner’s livestock. Grazer 
shall send a copy of the monthly pasture log to Owner with 
the monthly billing. Grazer agrees to routinely monitor the 
condition of Owner’s cattle and provide prudent veterinary care 
when necessary. Grazer agrees to maintain reasonable vigilance 
over Owner’s cattle and manage the grazing of said cattle so as 
to optimize the quality of grass available to them. Grazer shall 
also provide, at his expense, labor for handling Owner’s cattle 
including, but not limited to, receiving, spring calf working, 
pre-conditioning, weaning (on to a truck), and seasonal shipping 
arranged by Owner.”
The plaintiff presented evidence that the cows produced far fewer 
calves and that many animals were malnourished and sick.  The 
plaintiff sought damages for the loss in value of the open cows 
and for the loss of calves, for the value of dead cows and for the 
rehabilitation costs of the sick cows and bulls.  The defendant 
argued that this provision required only that the defendant provide 
whatever food was available on the land and did not guarantee any 
condition of the cows. The court disagreed and held that the contract 
required	the	defendant	to	provide	sufficient	feed,	veterinary	care,	
reasonable vigilance and monitoring of the health of the cattle. 
The	poor	condition	of	the	cattle	was	sufficient	evidence	that	the	
defendant breached the contract and allowed the plaintiff to recover 
damages based on the loss of value caused by malnourishment and 
lack of veterinary care. The court held the damages for the open 
cows was limited to the loss of value determined by the lack of a 
calf and could not be based on the loss of value as an open cow 
compared to a bred cow and include the loss of value of the lost 
calf. Peterson v. Ferrell, 2015 Kan. LEXIS 356 (Kan. 2015), 
aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 288 P.2d 870 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
FEDERAL FARM
PROGRAMS
 NO ITEMS.  
BANKRuPTCy
CHAPTER 12
 CLAIMS.	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	12	in	March	2014	and	
the debtor’s schedules listed a debt to a bank secured by real 
property. A notice was sent to the bank of the meeting of creditors 
and	the	deadline	for	filing	claims	of	July	7,	2014.	In	May	2014,	
the	bank’s	attorney	filed	a	notice	of	appearance	request	for	notice	
for	the	bank	in	which	the	bank	was	identified	as	a	creditor	entitled	
to	notice.	However,	 the	bank	did	not	file	a	proof	of	claim	until	
August 11, 2014, over a month after the claims deadline. The 
debtor proposed a plan which did not include any payments on 
the bank’s clam as a disallowed claim, retained the bank’s lien, 
provided for adequate protection of the property, and provided 
for post-plan payments on the debt. The bank objected to the plan 
and the debtor objected to the bank’s claim as untimely.  The bank 
argued	that	the	appearance	by	its	attorney	was	sufficient	notice	of	
its	claim	to	preserve	it	as	timely	filed.	However,	the	court	looked	at	
five	requirements	established	in	In re Reliance Equities, 966 F.2d 
1338 (10th Cir. 1992) for determining whether an informal claim 
was	 sufficient	 to	 be	 considered	 timely	filed	 if	 the	 creditor	 later	
filed	an	amendment	to	formalize	the	claim:	(1)	the	proof	of	claim	
must be in writing; (2) the writing must contain a demand by the 
creditor on the debtor’s estate; (3) the writing must express an intent 
to hold the debtor liable for the debt; (4) the proof of claim must 
be	filed	with	the	Bankruptcy	Court;	and	(5)	based	on	the	facts	of	
the case, it would be equitable to allow the amendment. The court 
noted that, in this case, the attorney’s appearance was in writing 
and was presented to the Bankruptcy Court, but did not assert any 
demand on the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, or express any intent to 
hold the debtor liable for the debt that made the bank one of their 
creditors. Therefore, the court held that the attorney’s appearance 
was	insufficient		to	be	recognized	as	an	informal	claim	and	that	the	
late-filed	claim	was	disallowed	as	untimely	filed.	In re Swenson, 
2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1922 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015).
 DISMISSAL.	The	 debtor	 filed	 a	 proposed	Chapter	 12	 plan	
in September 2014 and the plan provided that the debtor would 
seek to avoid two secured debts. The debtor was unsuccessful in 
avoiding either of the secured debts and sought further time to 
appeal; however, the debtor did not pursue the appeal and did not 
file	any	amended	plan.	The	court	court	noted	several	other	delaying	
tactics,	 including	the	debtor’s	firing	of	counsel	and	the	debtor’s	
failure to appear at a disposition and a hearing. The court noted 
that the estate had lost value during the delays and the debtor did 
not have income to pay the interest on the secured debts; thus, the 
court dismissed the case under Section 1208(c) for unreasonable 
delay by the debtor that was prejudicial to the creditors, failure to 
file	a	plan	timely,	failure	to	confirm	a	plan,	and	continuing	loss	to	
or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood 
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 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 GIFTS.	The	grantor	created	a	trust	for	the	benefit	of	the	grantor	
and three charities. The grantor retained a testamentary power to 
appoint the trust property in trust to a spouse, the charities, and two 
other named charitable organizations. Under Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
2(b) the retention of a testamentary power to appoint the remainder 
of a trust is considered a retention of dominion and control over the 
remainder. The IRS ruled  that the retention of this power causes 
the transfer of property to the trust to be incomplete with respect 
to the remainder interest in the trust. If the grantor releases the 
testamentary power, such release will result in a completed gift of the 
remainder interest in the trust. The grantor also retained the power 
to veto discretionary distributions to the charities and quarterly 
support and contingent distributions to the grantor. The grantor 
also retained the power to veto quarterly distributions to charities. 
Pursuant to these powers, at the time of the transfers to the trust, the 
grantor retained the right to veto any distributions of income and 
principal to any one or more of the charities during the grantor’s 
lifetime. The IRS ruled that transfers of property to the trust were 
incomplete gifts to the holders of the lifetime interests in the trusts. 
The release of these powers would result in completed gifts to the 
lifetime interest holders. The IRS also ruled that the incapacity of 
the grantor would not, of itself, result in a completed gift to the 
lifetime and remainder interest holders. In addition, the existence 
of a springing power of attorney, which would be activated upon 
the incapacity of the grantor, did not make transfers to the trusts 
completed gifts unless distributions were made under the authority 
of the power of attorney. Ltr. Rul. 201525002, Feb. 6, 2015; Ltr. 
Rul. 201525003, Feb. 6, 2015.
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION
 CHARITABLE DEDuCTIONS. The taxpayer donated 
some fossils to a museum and claimed charitable deductions of 
$136,500 and $109,800 for the fair market value of the fossils as 
provided by two appraisal letters. Because the values exceeded 
$5,000, the taxpayer must (1) must obtain a contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment from the donee; (2) maintain reliable 
written records with respect to each donated item including (a) 
the approximate date and manner of the property’s acquisition, 
(b) a description of the property in detail reasonable under the 
circumstances, (c) the property’s cost or other basis, (d) the 
property’s fair market value at the time of contribution, and (e) 
the method by which its fair market value was determined; and 
(3)	obtain	a	“qualified	appraisal”	of	the	donated	items	and	attach	
to the tax return a fully completed appraisal summary on Form 
8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions. The court found two 
omissions	 by	 the	 taxpayer	which	disqualified	 the	 donations	 for	
a deduction. First, although the taxpayer provided a letter of an 
appraisal of the fossils, the purported appraiser denied writing 
the letters or making an appraisal. Second, the taxpayer failed 
to  maintain records of the approximate dates and manner of the 
fossils’ acquisition, their costs or other tax bases, or the method 
by which their purported fair market values were determined. 
Although the information was included on the Form 8283, 
the taxpayer provided no supporting records. In addition, the 
contemporaneous written acknowledgements of the gifts failed 
to include a statement as to whether any goods or services were 
provided by the donees to the taxpayer. Isaacs v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2015-121.
 DISABILITy PAyMENTS. The taxpayers were retired 
firefighters who had service-connected disabilities. The 
retirement pay for a disability retirement was equal to one-half 
of	 the	 taxpayers’	 final	 salary.	However,	 if	 the	 retirees	were	
also entitled to a service retirement pension and the service 
retirement payment was higher than the disability retirement 
payment, the taxpayers received the higher amount. The service 
retirement payment was based on years of service. The taxpayers 
sought to exclude the entire retirement payment under I.R.C. § 
104(a) but the IRS allowed the exclusion of only the disability-
related	portion,	the	one-half	of	the	final	salary	amount.	Treas.	
Reg. §1.104-1(b) provides that “[I.R.C. §] 104(a)(1) does not 
apply to a retirement pension or annuity to the extent that it 
is determined by reference to the employee’s age or length of 
service … even though the employee’s retirement is occasioned 
by an occupational injury or sickness.” The court held that the 
regulation was valid and required the taxpayer to include in 
taxable income the portion of the retirement payments based 
solely on length of service, that portion above one-half of the 
taxpayers’	final	salary.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	in	a	decision	
designated as not for publication. Campbell v. united States, 
2015-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,344 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’g, 
2013-2 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,629 (C.D. Calif. 2013).
 HOBBy LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed full time as an 
attorney	for	a	medical	corporation.	The	taxpayer	filed	a	Schedule	
C for an international consulting business which produced 
only net losses for 10 years, offsetting the salary income from 
the taxpayer’s employment. Using the factors of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.183-2(b), the court held that the consulting business was 
not	entered	into	with	the	intent	to	make	a	profit	because	(1)	the	
taxpayer	did	not	keep	sufficient	records	of	the	activity	to	analyze	
the	profitability	of	the	various	projects	or	make	any	changes	to	
those	activities	to	make	them	profitable,	(2)	the	taxpayer	had	no	
qualifications	to	conduct	business	as	an	international	consultant,	
(3)	the	taxpayer	did	not	spend	a	significant	amount	of	time	on	
the activity, (4) the activity produced only losses, (5) the losses 
offset substantial income from other sources, and (6) the taxpayer 
received considerable pleasure from the activity which involved 
foreign travel. Strode v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-117.
 PARTNERSHIPS
  DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a 
limited liability company taxed as a partnership and  comprised 
of two individuals and an S corporation as partners. The taxpayer 
was formed and operated for the sole purpose of constructing, 
marketing and selling homes on a parcel of real property. The 
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taxpayer obtained two loans, a senior loan from a bank and a 
junior loan from a corporation. The junior loan was secured by 
a second deed of trust to the property, which was subordinated 
only to the senior loan from the bank; a general assignment of 
the taxpayer’s rights, title, and interest in and to the property; a 
general assignment of the taxpayer’s members’ rights, title, and 
interest in and to the property; pledges of the membership interests 
in the taxpayer by the members; and unlimited, unconditional, 
and irrevocable guarantees by each member of the taxpayer. The 
senior loan was foreclosed and the taxpayer’s property transferred 
to the bank in full satisfaction of the senior loan. The junior loan 
was cancelled for lack of any property to recover. In a Chief 
Counsel Advice letter, the issue was whether the junior loan was 
recourse or nonrecourse in character. The examining agent argued 
that the loans were nonrecourse and the discharge of indebtedness 
should be treated as gain from the sale of the taxpayer’s property. 
The treatment as a sale would prohibit the taxpayer members from 
using I.R.C. § 108(b) to allocate their share of the discharge of 
indebtedness income to tax items of the members such as losses 
and depreciation. Although the IRS did not rule on whether 
the junior loan was recourse or nonrecourse, the IRS did state 
that the issue was determined under I.R.C. §§ 61 and 1001 and 
their regulations and not I.R.C. § 752. Although I.R.C. § 752 
did	relate	 to	 the	definition	of	nonrecourse	and	recourse	 loans,	
Section	752	definitions	were	limited	to	the	issue	of	determining	
a partner’s basis in the partnership interest and not the character 
of discharge of indebtedness income. The IRS noted that the 
junior loans had some characteristics of nonrecourse loans in 
that the loans were secured by the only property acquired by the 
taxpayer; however, the loans had recourse elements in that the 
members of the taxpayer pledged their interests in the taxpayer 
and provided personal guarantees of the loan. CCA 201525010, 
March 6, 2015.
 ELECTION TO ADJUST BASIS. The taxpayer was a limited 
liability company which elected to be taxed as a partnership. In 
one tax year, LLC member interests were sold; however, the 
LLC	failed	to	file	an	I.R.C.	§	754	election	to	adjust	the	basis	of	
LLC	property.	The	IRS	granted	an	extension	of	time	to	file	the	
election. Ltr. Rul. 201525008, March 11, 2015.
 PASSIVE ACTIVITy LOSSES.  The taxpayers, husband and 
wife,	owned	five	single-family	rental	properties	in	three	cities	
in two states. Four of the properties in Texas were managed by 
a Texas company and the company took care of most aspects of 
the rentals but consulted with the husband on major decisions. 
The one property in California was also managed by a company 
but the husband worked more personal hours on the management 
of that property. The husband prepared a summary of 764 hours 
spent on the rental activities, but the summary included hours 
spent researching new properties and research on other potential 
business activities. During the year involved, the husband was 
employed only 676 hours before the employment was terminated. 
The IRS disallowed most of the losses from the rental activities 
as passive activity losses because the taxpayer did not spend at 
least 750 hours on the activities. The court examined the summary 
of activity and found that the taxpayer spent at least 37 hours 
researching new business investment opportunities, including 
opening a wine bar and a self-storage facility. The other categories 
of monthly activities included property and rental management 
representing less than one-half of the hours for each month. 
Most of the hours for each month were in the following generic 
categories: research for properties near properties already owned; 
research	 into	 refinancing;	 research	 into	 buying	 of	 foreclosure	
properties; and researching new business opportunities. The court 
characterized most of the husband’s hours as in the nature of an 
investor; therefore, the court held that the taxpayers failed to 
show that the husband worked at least 750 hours in the tax year 
on the rental activities and the losses were passive activity losses. 
Padilla v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2015-38.
 PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer had worked for a city 
until forced to resign because of diabetes. The taxpayer was 
hospitalized in July 2011 from complications from the diabetes. 
In April 2011 the taxpayer received a distribution from retirement 
savings account held by the city retirement board. The taxpayer 
filed	a	2011	tax	return	which	included	a	Form	5329,	Additional 
Taxes on Qualified Plans (Including IRAs) and Other Tax-
Favored Accounts, claiming the distribution was exempt from 
the 10 percent additional tax on early distributions because of 
the taxpayer’s permanent disability. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) 
provides an exemption for distributions which are attributable 
to the taxpayer’s being disabled within the meaning of I.R.C. § 
72(m)(7). Subsection (m)(7) provides that a taxpayer is considered 
disabled if the taxpayer is “unable to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
to	be	of	long-continued	and	indefinite	duration.”	The	“substantial	
gainful activity” referenced in Subsection (m)(7) is the activity, 
or a comparable activity, customarily engaged in by the taxpayer 
before the onset of the disability. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-17A(f)(1). 
The court noted that, although the taxpayer provided substantial 
medical records of the treatment of the complication from diabetes 
in June 2011 and after, the taxpayer provided no medical records 
for the period just prior to receiving the distribution from the 
retirement fund. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayer was 
not entitled to the exemption under I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) for 
disability. Trainito v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2015-37.
 RETuRNS. The taxpayers were husband and wife in 2011 
when	 they	hired	an	attorney	 to	prepare	and	file	 their	 joint	 tax	
return. The taxpayers had executed Form 2848, Power of Attorney 
and Declaration of Representative, appointing the attorney and 
an assistant as the taxpayers’ representatives. However, the 
Form 2848 stated that the power did not include the authority 
to	sign	the	return	for	the	taxpayers.	The	return	was	filed	without	
the taxpayers’ signatures anyway and the IRS sought summary 
judgment to declare the return invalid. The taxpayers admitted 
that neither taxpayer was: (1) disabled or injured such that he 
or she was unable to sign the 2010 return, (2) was continuously 
absent from the United States for a period of at least 60 days 
before October 17, 2011, or (3) request permission, in writing, of 
the District Director for the Internal Revenue Service District in 
which his or her legal residence was located, for the 2010 return to 
be made by an agent. The court held that the return was invalid in 
that	neither	taxpayer	satisfied	any	of	the	conditions	under	which	a	
return may be made by an agent under Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)
(5). Levi v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-118.
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SAFE HARBOR IN TEREST RATES
July 2015
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR  0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
110 percent AFR 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
120 percent AFR 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Mid-term
AFR  1.77 1.76 1.76 1.75
110 percent AFR  1.95 1.94 1.94 1.93
120 percent AFR 2.12 2.11 2.10 2.10
  Long-term
AFR 2.74 2.72 2.71 2.70
110 percent AFR  3.01 2.99 2.98 2.97
120 percent AFR  3.29 3.26 3.25 3.24
Rev. Rul. 2015-15, I.R.B. 2015-27.
 S CORPORATIONS
  SHAREHOLDER INCOME. The taxpayer wholly-owned 
one construction S corporation and at least most of a second S 
corporation. The IRS examined the bank accounts of the two 
corporations and assessed additional taxes based on unreported 
income and disallowed deductions. The court found that the 
taxpayer failed to show that any of the adjustments were improper 
and the court held that the IRS assessments were correct. Wagner 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-120. 
 TAX PROTESTER. The taxpayer provided hay loading 
services for agribusinesses and admitted receiving compensation 
for those services. However, the taxpayer argued that the 
compensation was not taxable income because Congress has not 
enacted	a	law	making	it	mandatory	to	either	file	a	tax	return	or	
pay federal income tax. The court noted that the taxpayer had 
made similar arguments in a previous case and was on notice 
that such frivolous tax protester arguments have been rejected 
by the court.  The court held that the compensation was taxable 
income	and	assessed	additions	to	tax	for	failure	to	file	an	income	
tax return, pay estimated tax and pay the income tax due for the 
tax year at issue. The court also assessed a frivolous argument 
penalty of $1,000 with a warning that the penalty in future cases 
with similar arguments would be higher. Foryan v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2015-114.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
 RIGHT OF FIRST REFuSAL. The plaintiff and defendant 
had entered into cash crop leases in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
with a provision in the lease that the plaintiff had the “option to 
rent” in future years with “Terms and conditions to be agreed to by 
Landlord and Tenant.” In April 2012, the defendant contacted the 
plaintiff	to	determine	if	the	plaintiff	wished	to	exercise	the	“first	
right of refusal” to lease the farm in 2013 and set the acceptance 
date of August 1. The plaintiff stated that the plaintiff wanted 
to lease the farm at the same rent but the defendant refused that 
offer. The plaintiff then agreed to the terms on August 1 but while 
the	plaintiff	was	obtaining	financing,	the	defendant	entered	into	a	
lease/sale agreement with a third party. The plaintiff sued to breach 
of contract and the trial court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiff based on the ambiguity of the lease renewal terms and the 
evidence of the lease renewal negotiations. The defendant argued 
that the renewal term was an option which the plaintiff failed to 
exercise. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the parties 
used	the	terms	option	and	right	of	first	refusal	interchangeably	
and that the renewal provision included terms which were not 
specified	in	the	lease	in	the	phrase	“Terms	and	conditions	to	be	
agreed to by Landlord and Tenant.” Thus, the appellate court 
found the lease renewal provision ambiguous and the use of 
extrinsic evidence necessary to interpret the intent of the parties. 
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had 
a	right	of	first	refusal	if	the	parties	reached	an	agreement	as	to	the	
lease terms. In addition, the appellate court held that the extrinsic 
evidence showed that the parties entered into negotiations as to 
the	lease	rent	and	other	financial	requirements.	The	court	held	
that	the	defendant	breached	the	right	of	first	refusal	provision	by	
leasing the land to the third party after reaching agreement of the 
renewal terms with the plaintiff. Dowling Family Partnership 
v. Midland Farms, LLC, 2015 S.D. LEXIS 82 (S.D. 2015).
 TERMINATION. The subject farm was owned by the parents 
of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants. On the death of the 
father in 2003, the surviving spouse and the family believed 
that the parents owned the farm as joint tenants and the spouse 
transferred	the	farm	to	a	trust	for	the	spouse’s	benefit.	One	of	
the plaintiffs managed the farm for the parents and surviving 
spouse and entered into a year-to-year lease with another family 
member. When that lease was terminated by the tenant, the same 
land was leased to one of the defendants, a daughter and son-
in-law of the parents, under the same terms and rent. In 2007, it 
was discovered that the parents had owned the farm as tenants in 
common, meaning that the farm was owned equally by the new 
trust and the father’s estate. The plaintiffs and defendants made 
no changes to the lease and the plaintiffs accepted the rent for that 
2007 crop year. No termination notice was given to the defendants 
and they continued to farm the land in 2008 and purchased the 
land from the estate and trust later in 2008. The plaintiffs sued 
for	the	loss	of	higher	rent	and/or	profits	during	2008,	arguing	that	
the lease terminated at the death of the mother. Under 735 ILCS 
5/9-206, written notice of termination of a year-to-year lease 
is required not less than four months prior to end of the lease 
calendar year or the lease continues. The plaintiffs argued that 
735 ILCS 5/9-206.1(a) provided an exception where the lessor 
dies owning only a life estate in the land. The court held that the 
mother owned a life interest only in the income from the trust 
which owned the land and was the lessor; therefore, the exception 
did not apply. Because no written termination notice was served 
on the defendants, the lease continued on through 2008. Lower 
v. Appel, 2015 Ill. App. unpub. LEXIS 1458 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2015).
NuISANCE
 RIGHT-TO-FARM. The plaintiffs were farmers who grew 
genetically	modified	Roundup	Ready(r) alfalfa in the defendant 
county. The county had passed an ordinance banning all 
genetically-modified	 crops	 and	 the	 plaintiffs	 argued	 that	 the	
ordinance violated Ore. Stat. §§ 30.930-947, the Oregon Right-
also raised the issue that the holding of weddings and meetings was 
an allowed exceptional use in that the use was accessory to the use 
of land as a farm. The court noted that the accessory use exception 
required that the use “has commonly, habitually and by long practice 
been established as reasonably associated with the primary . . . use.” 
Although the plaintiff provided examples of many farms in New 
Hampshire which provide such weddings and meetings on their 
farms, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that such 
use was common and long-standing use of farms. Forster v. Town 
of Henniker, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 54 (N.H. 2015).
 AGRICuLTuRAL TAX 
SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl
 See the back page for information about these seminars.  Here 
are the cities and dates for the seminars this summer and early fall 
2015:
  August 24-25, 2015 - Holiday Inn, Council Bluffs, IA
  August 27-28, 2015 - Quality Inn, Ames, IA
  September 3 & 4, 2015 - Truman State University,
     Kirksville, MO
  September 14 & 15, 2015 - Courtyard Hotel,
     Moorhead, MN
  September 17 & 18, 2015 - Ramkota Hotel, Sioux Falls, SD
  September 28 & 29, 2015 - Holiday Inn, Rock Island, IL
  October 13 & 14, 2015 - Atrium Hotel, Hutchinson, KS
 Each seminar will be structured the same as described on the 
back cover of this issue. More information will be posted on www.
agrilawpress.com and in future issues of the Digest.
FARM ESTATE AND 
BuSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl
18th Edition (2014)
 The Agricultural Law Press is honored to publish the revised 
18th Edition of Dr. Neil E. Harl’s excellent guide for farmers 
and ranchers who want to make the most of the state and federal 
income and estate tax laws to assure the least expensive and most 
efficient	transfer	of	their	estates	to	their	children	and	heirs.		The	
18th Edition includes all new income and estate tax developments 
from the 2012 tax legislation and Affordable Care Act through 
2014.
 We also offer a PDF version for computer and tablet use for 
$25.00.
 Print and digital copies can be ordered directly from the Press 
by sending a check for $35 (print version) or $25 (PDF version) to 
Agricultural Law Press, 127 Young Rd., Kelso, WA 98626. Please 
include your e-mail address if ordering the PDF version and the 
digital	file	will	be	e-mailed	to	you.
 Credit card purchases can be made online at www.agrilawpress.
com or by calling Robert at 360-200-5666 in Kelso, WA.
 For more information, contact robert@agrilawpress.com. 
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to-Farm Act. The court found that the right-to-farm statute was 
intended to protect farmers from the encroachment of urban homes 
which	would	find	the	dust,	smell	and	noise	of	farming	irritating.	In	
addition, the court found that the statute had an exception for farming 
practices which could cause damage to other commercial farming. 
The court found that the ordinance had the purpose of protecting 
local farmers who did not grow GMO crops from contamination 
by the GMO crops. Therefore, the ordinance was not prohibited by 
the	right-to-farm	statute	and	was	specifically	allowed	by	the	statute.	
Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson County, 2015 u.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 69587 (D. Ore. 2015).
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
 AGRICuLTuRAL LABOR EXCLuSION. The plaintiffs were 
farm and ranch workers injured while employed in farm labor. 
The	 plaintiffs	 sought	workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 but	were	
denied because of the exclusion for agricultural laborers under N.M. 
Stat. § 52-1-6(A). The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 
the exclusion as violating the plaintiffs right to equal protection 
under the New Mexico Constitution. The court held that the 
exclusion	was	unconstitutional	 because	 it	 could	find	no	 rational	
purpose for the exclusion of on-farm workers who provided similar 
types of labor as non-farm workers, such as animal laborers and 
trainers for the entertainment industry. In addition, the court could 
not	find	any	legitimate	state	interest		served	by	excluding	agricultural	
workers from the workers’ compensation system and the court held 
that the exclusion did not further the stated purposes of the workers’ 
compensation system.  Rodriguez v. M.A. & Sons Chili Products, 
2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
ZONING
 AGRITOuRISM. The plaintiff owned and operated a Christmas 
tree farm on 110 acres. The plaintiff’s property was zoned for 
agricultural use. The plaintiff also used the property for weddings, 
celebrations, and business and educational events. The defendant 
town issued a violation notice that the use of the farm for property 
for weddings, celebrations, and business and educational events was 
not permitted under the zoning law. The plaintiff argued that such use 
was	agritourism	and	was	included	in	the	dfinition	of	agriculture	for	
zoning purposes. The court noted that the zoning ordinance used the 
definition	of	agriculture	in	N.H.	Rev.	Stat.	§	21:34-a.	The	court	held	
that, although Christmas tree farming was included in the statutory 
definition	of	agriculture,	agritourism	was	not	included.	However,	
the	definition	did	include	“Any	practice	on	the	farm	incident	to,	or	
in conjunction with such farming operations . . .” The statute also 
defines	agritourism	to	mean	“	.	.	.	attracting	visitors	to	a	working	farm	
for the purpose of eating a meal, making overnight stays, enjoyment 
of the farm environment, education on farm operations, or active 
involvement in the activity of the farm which is ancillary to the 
farm operation.” The court held that the activities prohibited by the 
defendant were not agritourism because the weddings and meetings 
did not involve activities ancillary to the farm operation. The plaintiff 
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by Neil E. Harl
  Join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax law. Gain insight and understanding from one of the country’s 
foremost authorities on agricultural tax law.  The seminars will be held on two days from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. Registrants may attend one or both 
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income tax. Your registration fee includes written comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended and lunch.  A discount ($25/day) 
is offered for attendees who elect to receive the manuals in PDF	format	only	(see	registration	form	online	for	use	restrictions	on	PDF	files).
See Page 111 above for a list of cities and dates for Summer and early Fall 2015
The topics include:
  
The	seminar	registration	fees	for	each	of	multiple	registrations	from	the	same	firm	and	for	current subscribers to the Agricultural Law 
Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Farm Estate and Business Planning are $225 (one day) and $400 (two days).  The early-
bird registration fees for nonsubscribers are $250 (one day) and $450 (two days). Nonsubscribers may obtain the discounted fees by 
purchasing any one or more of our publications. See www.agrilawpress.com for online book and newsletter purchasing.
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 Corporate-to-LLC conversions
 New regulations for LLC and LLP losses
Closely Held Corporations
 State anti-corporate farming restrictions
 Developing the capitalization structure
 Tax-free exchanges
 Would incorporation trigger a gift because of
  severance of land held in joint tenancy?
 “Section 1244” stock
    Status of the corporation as a farmer
 The regular method of income taxation
 The Subchapter S method of taxation, including
  the “two-year” rule for trust ownership of
  stock
 Underpayment of wages and salaries
Financing, Estate Planning Aspects and Dissolution
  of Corporations
 Corporate stock as a major estate asset
 Valuation discounts
 Dissolution and liquidation
 Reorganization
 Entity Sale
 Stock redemption
Social Security
   In-kind wages paid to agricultural labor 
Second day
FARM INCOME TAX
New Legislation
Reporting Farm Income
 Constructive receipt of income
 Deferred payment and installment payment
  arrangements for grain and livestock sales
 Using escrow accounts
 Payments from contract production
 Items purchased for resale
 Items raised for sale
 Leasing land to family entity
 Crop insurance proceeds
 Weather-related livestock sales
 Sales of diseased livestock
	 Reporting	federal	disaster	assistance	benefits
 Gains and losses from commodity futures, 
  including consequences of exceeding the
  $5 million limit
Claiming Farm Deductions
 Soil and water conservation expenditures
 Fertilizer deduction election
 Depreciating farm tile lines
 Farm lease deductions
 Prepaid expenses
 Preproductive period expense provisions
 Regular depreciation, expense method
  depreciation, bonus depreciation 
 Repairs and Form 3115; changing from accrual
  to cash accounting
 Paying rental to a spouse
 Paying wages in kind
 PPACA issues including scope of 3.8 percent tax
Sale of Property
 Income in respect of decedent
 Sale of farm residence
 Installment sale including related party rules
 Private annuity
 Self-canceling installment notes
 Sale and gift combined.
Like-Kind Exchanges
 Requirements for like-kind exchanges
 “Reverse Starker” exchanges
     What is “like-kind” for realty
 Like-kind guidelines for personal property 
    Partitioning property
    Exchanging partnership assets
Taxation of Debt
 Turnover of property to creditors
 Discharge of indebtedness
 Taxation in bankruptcy.
First day
FARM ESTATE AND BuSINESS PLANNING
New Legislation 
Succession planning and the importance of
 fairness
The Liquidity Problem
Property Held in Co-ownership
 Federal estate tax treatment of joint tenancy
 Severing joint tenancies and resulting basis
 Joint tenancy and probate avoidance
 Joint tenancy ownership of personal property
 Other problems of property ownership
Federal Estate Tax
 The gross estate
 Special use valuation
 Property included in the gross estate
 Traps in use of successive life estates
 Basis calculations under uniform basis rules
 Valuing growing crops
 Claiming deductions from the gross estate
 Marital and charitable deductions
 Taxable estate
 The applicable exclusion amount
	 Unified	estate	and	gift	tax	rates
 Portability and the regulations
 Federal estate tax liens
 Undervaluations of property
Gifts
	 Reunification	of	gift	tax	and		estate	tax
 Gifts of property when debt exceeds basis 
use of the Trust
The General Partnership
 Small partnership exception
 Eligibility for Section 754 elections
Limited Partnerships
Limited Liability Companies
 Developments with passive losses
